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Abstract 
Background: The safety assessment in site selection for a new nuclear power plant is an essential issue for human 
health. It could be improved by predicting the consequences for a hypothetical accident. This paper is contextual 
with the nuclear safety regarding the risk upon human health from the hazard constituted by the emission of radio‑
active material due to a hypothetical nuclear power plant accident. HYSPLIT model used and configured based on 
terrestrial and meteorological conditions for this purpose.
Results: It presents an analysis of the time‑series and spatial distribution for dispersed radioactive contaminants from 
a hypothetical accident at Baiji potential site. This is based on the geological and meteorological specifications of the 
potential site. Hybrid Single‑Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory (HYSPLIT) model configured to simulate the 
atmospheric dispersion of fission emissions, then assesses the public health consequences of a hypothetical nuclear 
accident. Results indicate that the total individual dose intake by the population living around the potential site from 
the hypothetical accident exceeded 1 Sv, greater than the allowed dose limits by International Commission on Radio‑
logical Protection (ICRP). The probability of cancer incidence at regions on directions of southeast to northeast along 
30 km from the potential site was high (0.0378 to 0.00131) risk/person. However, the areas that laid on the west and 
south‑west of the site recorded higher levels of influence compared to regions on other directions. Also, the reduction 
of exposure dose with the distance from the site presented. The north‑direction regions from the Baiji site recorded a 
rapid reduction of exposure dose to become zero at 40 km distance.
Conclusions: Finally, to minimize the radiological impacts on population, emergency procedures are required at the 
regions that laid on the west and south‑west of the site. These countermeasure remedy actions should include evacu‑
ation, sheltering, ban the sale of local agriculture productions, and long‑range resettlement of the population. Since 
the plume of radioactive contaminants did not arrive at the regions on east and northeast, 40 km away from Baiji site, 
these areas could be categorized as a support zone.
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Background
Accident management is an important factor that ensures 
an effective defense in depth implementations. According 
to defense in depth principles, each safety design level 
should be individually protected and to be independent 
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of other levels [1–3]. This consideration ensures the 
availability of accident management provisions for any 
case and to be well defined, even if the provisions within 
the design components are sufficient [4, 5]. Deciding on 
an emergency planning zone (EPZ) is an implementa-
tion of defense in depth concepts, especially for the fifth 
safety level [6–8]. It is also an essential procedure in 
nuclear safety management. Emergency planning zones 
are off-site areas around the nuclear facilities, including 
new nuclear power plants. These are prepared in advance 
for any effective and protective actions that are required 
during any undesired accident to ensure the protection of 
public health, the environment, and properties [5, 8].
The pre-evaluations of radiological impact for normal 
operation of a new nuclear power plant at Baiji potential 
site were conducted for two different types of nu- clear 
reactors; VVER 440 and AP100 reactors [9, 10]. The 
assessment showed that normal operation of a nuclear 
power plant at Baiji potential site is safe and poses no sig-
nificant biological effect upon population living around, 
but no investigation has been conducted previously to 
study the radiological impact of any hypothetical acci-
dent at Baiji potential site [9, 10]. Therefore, this work 
aspires to fill this gap in the safety assessment proce-
dures for this potential site [9–11]. Baiji site with other 
three sites were nominated by Iraqi Atomic Council for 
new installation of a new nuclear power plant in Iraq [11, 
12]. Iraq showed early desire to employ nuclear technolo-
gies in scientific researches and energy production [10, 
11, 13]. The Iraqi government returned back this desire 
to handle the chronic shortage in electricity provision. 
Also, to reduce the significant increase in greenhouse-gas 
levels in Iraq, which primarily resulted from consump-
tion of fossil fuel [14, 15]. Safety is the basis in nuclear 
reactor’s design so that the occurrence of failures is very 
low, and if that happened, the effects are on not to afford 
any risks to public health [16, 17]. Each nuclear reactor, 
whether used for research purposes or in electricity gen-
eration, produces a considerable amount of radioactive 
substances, which might be a source of risk to the human 
life and the surrounding environment [16, 18, 19]. So it 
requires a precautionary procedure to prevent this risk. 
Nuclear safety is a set of technical and regulatory provi-
sions that could be applied in the design, site selection, 
construction, and operation procedures for each nuclear 
facility to control and reduce the probability of unde-
sired accidents or to reduce the subsequence effects of 
an accident [20, 21]. The defense in depth concept is an 
important key element to ensure the nuclear safety. This 
concept intended containment of the radioactive mate-
rials by protecting an integration of physical barriers 
against internal or external events. This approach intends 
to impede any radiological incidents fully or to limit and 
reduce any consequences if prevention has failed. As well 
as, it is to avoid any increase in the successive impacts 
that should lead to more serious conditions [21, 22].
Nuclear accident scenario selection
Any accident sequence initiates by an event which should 
occur by an external factor such as earthquake, flood, 
tsunami. Moreover, the internal factors such as loss of 
off-site power, loss of coolant, or human-made failures 
could be considered as initiator events [6–8]. The nuclear 
reactor control and safety system might be affected by 
any initiating events. Furthermore, the steady state of 
operation for the nuclear reactor should be perturbed. 
Consequently, these will lead to a failure in operation, 
which probably causes a damage to the reactor core. As 
a result, a high level of radioactive fission products will 
emit to the environment [23].
The nuclear power plant comprises a diverse range of 
safety and control systems [23]. The possibility of differ-
ent accident sequences is featured according to the initial 
events, the defect of equipment and the kind of involved 
operator actions. Event-fault tree analysis could be used 
as a logic model to develop the accident sequences [24]. 
Then, the identification of possible accident sequences 
will be more systematic. Probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) concept follows this mechanism to enhance the 
nuclear safety by preventing probable accidents for the 




With cooperation of JSC Atomstroyexport company 
[26], Iraqi Atomic Energy Council IAEC nominated four 
potential sites; Abu Daalaf, Abbasiyah, Baiji and Mahzam 
[27, 28]. The study of radiological impact of a new nuclear 
power plant conducted for Baiji nominated site among 
other nominated sites, is shown in Fig. 1.
Iraq has a climate zone of continental and subtropical 
type, as it is located in the south-western side of Asian 
continent. Thus, it is under the influence of any change 
occurred at neighboring regions such as Mediterranean 
Sea and Indian desert [29]. This explains why the winter 
season is always cool to cold with an average temperature 
between 2 and 15  °C and a moderate humidity per day, 
ranging between 8% in summer to 100% in winter season, 
as shown in Fig.  2. Summer is well-known by dry and 
extreme hot weather, as the temperature exceeds 40  °C 
during July and August day-time.
The Baiji nominated site (34.98°N, 43.40°E) is influ-
enced by the same weather conditions. The tempera-
ture varies between 0 and ≤ 40 °C along four seasons, as 
shown in Fig. 3. Baiji city is located through a piedmont 
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zone that extends from north to the south with lowlands 
and semi-plains [26, 28]. This region’s elevation varies 
between 200 and 500 m above sea level [30]. Moreover, 
the Makhoul-Hamrin ridge lies at the southernmost of 
the zone [26, 27, 30].
Another meteorological parameter that influences 
the particle dispersion at the potential site is the wind 
speed and direction. The wind conditions were consid-
ered as a critical factor in Baiji potential site, as they 
decide the dispersion profile of any emitted pollution in 
the atmosphere medium. Figure 4 shows the wind-roses 
of Baiji potential sites at recent 4  years 2015–2018. It 
Fig. 1 The Baiji potential site’s location [9]
Fig. 2 The hourly and annual average humidity at Baiji nominated 
site for the year 2017
Fig. 3 The daily average temperature at Baiji nominated site for years 
2010–2018
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represents a comparison of wind speed and direction at 
first week of December for the mentioned 4 years.
Spatial distribution time‑series
In order of evaluation the time-series of the spatial dis-
tribution for the radioactive plume over the cities around 
Baiji potential site, 12 cities were chosen according to 
their population density and their distance to the Baiji 
nominated site, as shown in Table  1. The direction and 
the location of these cities were considered from the 
nominated site. However, the west regions from the 
Baiji nominated site had very low population densities. 
Moreover, population density is different for these cities 
according to their geographical location.
HYSPLIT model configuration
HYSPLIT model configured according to radionuclide 
properties and available data on the release rate of radi-
onuclides to the atmosphere during assumed accidents. 
The simulation was conducted for the atmospheric dis-
persion of radioactive emissions. Both puff and particle 
dispersion equations in HYSPLIT are expressed in terms 
of turbulent velocity components (U,W) [31–33]. The 
new position of particles or puffs has computed by add-
ing the turbulent component to the mean position (X), as 
expressed in Eq. 1 [32, 33]:
For the new position towards (Z) direction, the compu-
tation is according to the Eq. 2. This is due to the mean 
advection in the wind [32, 33].
(1)
Xfinal(t + �t) = Xmean(t + �t) + U
t(t + �t)�tG.
Fig. 4 The wind‑rose of wind speed and direction frequency in first 
week of December, at Baiji potential site for years: a 2015, b 2016, c 
2017, and d 2018
Table 1 Highly populated cities around  nominated sites 
for potential NPP with location and distance





Baghdad 33.32 44.36 215 6000
Mosul 36.35 43.15 150 1800
Erbil 36.19 44.01 143 935
Kirkuk 35.46 44.38 100 610
Samarra 34.19 43.89 100 158.5
Ramadi 33.43 43.29 175 275
Fallujah 33.35 43.78 185 191
Baqubah 33.744 44.61 177 153
Tikrit 34.59 43.67 50 42.5
Balad 34.01 44.14 128 42
Baiji 34.93 43.49 12 36.5
Shirqat 35.50 43.23 60 25
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where the positions (horizontal (X) and vertical (Z)) are 
given in grid and sigma units, respectively, while the 
components of turbulent velocity are in  ms−1. G and Ztop 
are conversion factors. The concentration distribution by 
each puff of mass m to a grid point increase according to 
Eq. 3:
where C is air concentration, m is the pollutant mass, r 
is the distance from the source and r = 1.54 σh, where 
σz and σh are the dispersion coefficient in crosswind 
direction and vertical direction the vertical extent, and 
∆z = 3.08 σz.
The total dose intakes through inhalation and external 
exposure pathways were
calculated using Eq. 4:
where C is the air concentration of the pollutant or 
ground deposition, Dcf is the dose conversion factor of 
each radionuclide for each pathway and (t2 − t1) is the 
duration of the exposure to the pollutant [32, 33]. ICRP 
60 and 103 regulatory standards were adopted in all esti-
mation processes, for more precision, including dose 
conversion factors and dose limits [34, 35].
The calculation of cancer risks due to the exposure to a 
certain measure of annual effective dose equivalent per-
formed by using the general formula that is authorized by 
ICRP organization according to dose-to-risk coefficients 
[35]. Equation 5 explains the major formula to calculate 
the cancer fatality risk:
where, E(t) is the total dose and 0.05 Sv−1 is dose-to-risk 
coefficient for cancer fatality risk in the population.
Accident scenario selection
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the 
organization which is responsible for the regulations and 
guidances for the nuclear facilities, is involved intensively 
in the study of the nuclear accidents and its consequences 
upon environment and humans. Furthermore, it provides 
the appropriate suggestions and recommendations to 
new nuclear enterprises to avoid repeating these acci-
dents [7]. Consequently, many study and regulation series 
have been published such as Safety Standards Series Nos 
NS-R-1, NS-R-2, Safety Standards Series No. NS-G-1.2, 
(2)














(5)RiskCancerfatality = 0.05 Sv
−1
∗ E(t),
INSAG Reports, Technical Reports and TECDOCs and 
others to enlighten future vision about new generations 
of nuclear power reactors and the new nuclear power 
plant constructions [6, 36]. International Nuclear and 
Radiological Event Scale (INES), cosponsored by the 
IAEA and OECD/NEA, classified nuclear accident into 
seven classes according to the event initiator and their 
consequences. The classification of all nuclear accidents 
up until today is illustrated in Fig. 5 [6, 36].
United States Nuclear Regularity Commission 
(U.S.NRC) announced a project entitled State-of-the-Art 
Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA), to develop 
a knowledge body about the pragmatic results of select-
ing any severe nuclear reactor accident [6]. As a result of 
the research group focus, all previous severe accidents 
in nuclear power plants have been analyzed in detailed 
integration, and more realistically than ever before [23]. 
Based on SOARCA outputs and considering the most 
frequent initiated events in severe nuclear accidents, five 
scenarios have been chosen by NRC organization [23].
All severe accidents release scenarios; source term (ST), 
together with the fifth scenario ST5 based on reference 
information of releases for pressurized water reactors 
(PWR) [23]. The SOARCA project classified the scenar-
ios into two main categories, station blackouts (SBOs) 
and early failure (or bypass) of containment. The latter 
category is supposed to be higher in both consequence 
and risk. The SOARCA project has considered external 
events, seismic event, as initiators for three source term 
scenarios; (ST1), (ST2) and (ST3) [23, 37]. For the fourth 
Fig. 5 INES classification for accident level [6, 36]
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scenario (ST4), the initiator event is an internal event. 
The fourth scenario (ST4) assumes a severe failure in 
the nuclear power plant such as a core melt without any 
defect in its safety filtering system. The fifth assumption 
of accident scenario (ST5) was one where the nuclear 
power plant suffered a severe failure (core melt), but its 
safety filtration systems were assumed to remain intact 
[23].
Considering the geological, seismic and tectonic 
parameters at study area, the probability of external 
events is very low, as there are no records for any severe 
accident in the industrial sector during last 50 years initi-
ated by an external event in Iraq [38]. Hence Iraq is safe 
for high-magnitude earthquakes, especially the study 
area (nominated sites). Otherwise, earthquake should 
be excluded as an external event initiator. However, the 
release scenarios are still the best estimation that is avail-
able as a severe accident in PWR reactors that could 
result from an external event [30, 38].
Accidental release rate
The annual release has been adopted from official institu-
tions such as IAEA and NRC-USA for ST4 scenario [23, 
39]. The input data of meteorological, location, sources 
(radioactive pollutants) and the dispersion specifica-
tions were selected similar to the normal operation. The 
release rates of radionuclides were chosen based on the 
accident scenario. The half-life, release rate, type of emit-
ted radiation and risk group were considered for selected 
radionuclides in the study. The simulation was run for 
radionuclides that was included in Table 2 for both ST1 
and ST4 scenarios.
Results and discussion
The simulations were carried out to study the dispersion 
profile of radioactive pollution that is released from Baiji 
nominated site during the hypothetical accident ST4. 
The accident was assumed to occur for 3 days on the first 
week of December, 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018. These 
dates were selected based on the facts that the probability 
of the rain is high due to the high rate of precipitation, 
Also, the temperature reaches below 0  °C, and the dif-
ference between the maximum and minimum tempera-
ture is significantly large between daytime and nighttime. 
Therefore, these events could be considered as the most 
likely external natural events to initiate any hypothetical 
accident. Moreover, this is to evaluate the consequent 
health impacts in terms of annual effective dose equiva-
lent and cancer risk.
Atmospheric dispersion profile during the hypothetical 
nuclear accident
The atmospheric dispersion of radioactive discharges 
simulated for a hypothetical severe accident at Baiji 
nominated site. The nuclear accident is of the type (ST4) 
which is initiated by an internal event such as loss of 
coolant. Figure  6 illustrates the atmospheric dispersion 
contours and magnitudes for an accidental release. This 
is due to a hypothetical accident (ST4) for 72  h at sec-
ond week of December. The simulation repeated for four 
sequent years (2015–2018), as the study area is character-
ized by continental weather. The air concentration at the 
center of the site records high values of 323 × 103 Bq m−3 
at 2018 to 894 × 103 Bq m−3 at 2015.
The radioactive plume of 131I radionuclide was dis-
persed mostly around Baiji toward those areas that were 
west, south-west of the site during years of 2015, 2017 
and 2018. These areas are called the West-Jazeera desert, 
where the population density is significantly below 50 
people per  km2. Also, it was dispersed throughout the 
south and south-east of Baiji nominated site during the 
year of 2016. Baiji city was the only area that was highly 
influenced area during all dates of simulation. Otherwise, 
Table 2 Accidental releases for  source term scenarios ST1 
and ST4 according to the accident scenarios
Radionuclide Half‑life ST1 release (GBq) ST4 release (GBq)
Kr‑85 10.7 years 3E+07 5E+07
Kr‑85 m 4.48 h 6E+08 1E+09
Kr‑87 76.3 min 1E+09 2E+09
Kr‑88 2.48 h 2E+09 3E+09
Rb‑86 18.63 days 0E+00 2E+05
Mo‑99 66.02 h 0E+00 2E+07
Te‑127 9.35 h 2E+06 5E+0
Te‑127 m 109 days 3E+05 8E+06
Te‑129 69.6 min 8E+06 2E+08
Te‑129 m 33.6  days 1E+06 3E+07
Te‑131 m 30 h 4E+06 9E+07
Te‑132 78.2 h 4E+07 8E+08
Sb‑127 3.89 days 2E+06 5E+07
Sb‑129 4.31 h 8E+06 2E+08
I‑131 8.04 days 1E+07 6E+08
I‑132 2.30 h 2E+07 9E+08
I‑133 20.8 h 3E+07 E+09
I‑134 52.6 min 3E+07 1E+09
I‑135 6.61 h 2E+07 1E+09
Xe‑133 5.25 days 4E+09 8E+09
Xe‑135 9.09 h 1E+09 2E+09
Cs‑134 2.06 years 0E+00 2E+07
Cs‑136 13.2 days 0E+00 4E+06
Cs‑137 30 years 0E+00 1E+07
Page 7 of 12Mohammed Saeed et al. Environ Sci Eur            (2020) 32:6 
Fig. 6 Atmospheric dispersion of 131I radionuclide for a hypothetical accident release scenario (ST4) at Baiji nominated site for years; a 2015, b 2016, 
c 2017, and d 2018
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the plume did not arrive at highly populated cities such 
as Baghdad, Mosul, or Erbil during the first 3  days of 
the accidental release. The radioactive plume reached 
Samarra city, one of the cities with high population den-
sity. However, it takes more than 1  day from the acci-
dent day to rich cities such as Samarra. Furthermore, 
the radioactive plume became less concentrated while it 
arrived at Samarra, Balad, Shirqat, or Baqubah Cities. For 
instance, in 2015, the air concentration of the 131I radio-
nuclide decreased from 2.1 × 106 Bq m−3 at the Baiji city 
to 4.9 × 104 Bq m−3 at Samarra city, as the plume needs 
30 h to arrive Samarra city. This fact should be helpful in 
any preparedness of emergency plans for any undesired 
accident.
Based on the weather conditions such as humidity, 
precipitation rate, wind velocity and its direction, the 
deposition of fission products occurs once they dispersed 
around the nuclear power plant site. However, the depo-
sition of radioactive releases appeared to be zero at the 
area of 20 km radius around the potential site, as shown 
in Fig.  7. For instant, the dispersed particles of 137Cs 
arrived Shirqat city after 40  h during 2015, and it took 
28 h to arrive at Samarra city during 2016.
In addition, the health risk that resulted from ground 
deposition of radioactive gaseous and particulates is not 
instantaneous, but it is long-term one [40], while the 
ground soils or aquatic surfaces that are contaminated by 
the deposition of radioactive pollution is susceptible for 
turning into another source of radiation and contributed 
as an external exposure pathway [40, 41]. Otherwise, the 
contribution of ground deposition to radiation exposure 
is dominated by the future human activities at the con-
taminated areas, which could be replaced by alternative 
resources of food, drink or other human needs [40, 41].
The time‑series of 131I radionuclide air concentration 
in Baiji nominated site during ST4 scenario
Figures 8 and 9 show the dispersed plume of 131I radionu-
clide emissions from Baiji nominated site during the ST4 
scenario at same date and duration for years 2015 and 
2016.
The dispersion profile of the radioactive plume seems 
clearly different, and it covers divergent areas around 
Baiji potential site. Whereas the radioactive plume of 131I 
radionuclide air concentration reaches Erbil, Ramadi, 
Fig. 7 Ground deposition of 137Cs radionuclide for a hypothetical 
accident release scenario (ST4) at Baiji nominated site for years: a 
2015, b 2016
Fig. 8 Time‑series of air concentration for 131I radionuclide at 2015 
for ST4 scenario at Baiji nominated site
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and Fallujah cities in 2016, however they are located at 
distances of (140–190 km) as shown in Table 1. Further-
more, for all years of simulation, the plume of radioactive 
pollution covers cities of Baiji (12  km), Tikrit (50  km), 
Samarra (100 km), and Balad (128 km). This means that 
the regions around the Baiji potential site at the range of 
(10–130 km) should be accounted as contaminated area 
after any undesired accident.
Assessment of radiological impacts and risks of accidental 
releases from Baiji nominated site for ST4 scenario
The assessments were conducted to assess the total 
health impact of the hypothetical accident scenario ST4 
from Baiji nominated site. The evaluations were in terms 
of total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) and cancer risk.
The variation of total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) 
for ST4 scenario in Baiji nominated site
The total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) at any point 
around the nominative site is dependent on the weather 
conditions around the NPP such as wind speed and 
direction, temperature, and humidity. Therefore, the 
TEDE changes according to distance and direction to the 
nominated site.
Table  3 shows the total effective dose equivalent at 
different locations and directions from the Baiji nomi-
nated site for the ST4 accident scenario. The TEDE at 
areas close to the NPP were considerably high, with a 
value of 7.74 × 103 mSv at the center of the site. However, 
along the distance this value decreased to the range of 
0–81 mSv at 70 km from the NPP. Exposure dose propor-
tionally decreased with distance from the NPP for a cer-
tain direction.
At 5  km from the NPP, the TEDE reached its highest 
value of 3.43 × 103 mSv in the southeast of the NPP, while 
the lowest level was 6  mSv at northeast of the NPP. At 
10 km from the NPP, the highest TEDE was received by 
receptors from the west of the NPP of 1.44 × 103  mSv, 
while the lowest was 0  mSv at the east of the NPP. At 
20 km, populations living at the west regions of the Baiji 
nominated site received the highest TEDE of 678  mSv, 
while regions on the north to east received the lowest 
TEDE of (0–12) mSv. At 30 km from the NPP, the TEDE 
decreased significantly. The highest TEDE was 261 mSv 
at the west and southeast of the NPP, while at the north 
and east of the NPP the values ranged between 0 and 
Fig. 9 Time‑series of air concentration for 131I radionuclide at 2016 
for ST4 scenario at Baiji nominated site
Table 3 Total effective dose for different locations and directions from the NPP at Baiji nominated site for ST4
Total effective dose (mSv)
Direction Distance (km)
0 5 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
North 7740 45 36 12 3 0 0 0 0
Northeast 7740 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
East 7740 507 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Southeast 7740 3430 545 369 186 72 30 21 6
South 7740 1326 549 375 261 201 153 132 36
Southwest 7740 2560 523 138 117 18 15 9 6
West 7740 3150 1440 678 261 135 123 126 81
Northwest 7740 693 323 204 147 51 72 42 30
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3 mSv. At 40 km from the NPP, the TEDE decreased. The 
population at 40  km south from the NPP received the 
highest annual effective dose of 201  mSv, while on the 
north and east sides, they did not receive any exposure 
dose.
Figure  10 shows the variation in TEDE on the south, 
along 70  km from Baiji nominated site. The results 
show that the TEDE at the south regions decreased sig-
nificantly. However, it was still high compared to other 
directions even at far locations from the NPP. Thus, 
these areas should be considered as the most influenced 
regions around Baiji nominated site during accidents.
Most regions located on the south from the Baiji nomi-
nated site within a radius of 50 km should be considered 
as extreme exposure areas. This is due to the high level of 
radiation exposure along the plume travel direction dur-
ing accidents.
Figure  11 shows the variation in TEDE along 70  km, 
north of Baiji nominated site. The results show that the 
TEDE decreased rapidly from 7740 to 12 mSv at 20 km 
from the NPP, with consideration for plume zone. The 
TEDE declined to 3 mSv at 30 km from the NPP outside 
the plume zone.
This should help in the decision about the selection of 
evacuation areas around the NPP, as the north and north-
eastern regions are mostly safe and free of radiation at 
40 km from the NPP during the release time of the acci-
dent scenarios.
As a result, the TEDE level was significantly high inside 
the plume zone in all directions. Nevertheless, it starts to 
decrease for most of the directions except for the direc-
tion of the wind inside the ingestion zone as shown in 
Figs. 10 and 11.
The risk probability of cancer incidence was high with 
value of 0.0387 risk/people at the center of Baiji potential 
site. However, its value was different at areas around the 
potential site as same of the total dose intake. Figure 12 
shows the decrement of the cancer incidence probability 
along the south direction from the potential site.
Conclusions
The assessment of health impact consequences for a 
nuclear accident at Baiji potential site was based on simu-
lation of atmospheric dispersion for emitted radionuclides 
over Baiji nominated site and surrounded areas during ST1 
and ST4 accidental release scenarios. Based on the time-
series analysis, Baiji city received more than 100  mSv of 
TEDE and categorized as a plume zone. The instant protec-
tive actions, such as immediate evacuation, sheltering and 
medication are required. For the city of Tikrit categorized 
as ingestion zone, continuous monitoring of the radioactive 
Fig. 10 The variation of annual effective dose equivalent to the 
south of Baiji nominated site for ST4 scenario
Fig. 11 The variation of annual effective dose equivalent at the 
northern direction for ST4 scenario from Baiji nominated site
Fig. 12 The variation of cancer incidence risk at the southern 
direction for ST4 scenario from Baiji nominated site
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contaminants is required to avoid the intake of these con-
taminants. However, other cities were less influenced by 
the accident compared to Baiji and Tikrit, but still moni-
toring and medication processes are required. The areas 
that are outside the 30-km radius in the direction of North 
and Northeast from Baiji site is categorized as support area 
zone due to the absence of radioactive contaminants dur-
ing the accident scenarios. The results of the current work 
provide preliminary expectations about environmental and 
radiological impacts as well as exposure limits received by 
the populations. In order to ensure an adequate mitigation 
of the nuclear accident consequences for the environment 
and surrounding populations, these assessments could help 
in deciding the emergency plans.
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